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Abstract
The Willingness-to-Pay approach is the basic justi…cation for the use of the
Contingent Valuation method to evaluate public mortality risk reduction pro-
grams. However, aggregating unweighted willingness-to-pay is a valid method
only when individuals have the same marginal value of money, an unrealistic
assumption in the presence of heterogeneity. We show that heterogeneity
on wealth and baseline risk (respectively on risk reduction) leads to system-
atically overestimate (respectively underestimate) the social value of a risk
reduction program. Using a recently published Contingent Valuation anal-
ysis, we …nd this overestimation to be quite modest though, approximately
15% in an upper bound case.
JEL classi…cation: H43, D81, Q26
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Introduction
Many regulatory decisions, such as the decision to control toxic substances
in the environment, require to explicitly or implicitly weigh lives against
money. Economists have developed several methods to explicitly place a
dollar value on life-savings bene…ts. These methods rest upon the observation
that individuals make, at the margin, some trade-o¤s between money and
their own probability of dying. In particular, the concept of willingness-
to-pay (WTP) to reduce mortality risks (see Drèze, 1962, Schelling, 1968,
Jones-Lee, 1976) is certainly the most common and widely accepted criterion
among economists (Viscusi, 1993; for various examples see the recent issues
of the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty).
Current practices often evaluate a risk reduction public project by com-
paring the average individual’s WTP to the per capita cost of the project.
However, the WTP is expressed in dollars and not in terms of utility, so
that the WTP approach does not capture individuals’ changes in (expected)
utility levels. As a result, simply averaging individuals’ WTP is inconsis-
tent with the maximization of an utilitarian social welfare function, except
in the special case where individuals all have the same marginal utility of
money. This case, however, is unrealistic and di¢cult to justify empirically.
The WTP approach has then been intensively criticized by many scholars
in Publics Economics and Environmental Economics (Boadway, 1982, Drèze
and Stern, 1987, Blackorby and Donaldson, 1990, Brekke, 1997, Drèze, 1998).
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Despite the numerous criticisms, we have not found any analysis that investi-
gates the welfare distortions created by the WTP approach. This paper is an
attempt to address this question in the context of mortality risks regulation.
To understand why the WTP approach creates a welfare distortion, con-
sider the following simple example. Two agents i = 1; 2 compose the soci-
ety. Their initial wealth is (w1; w2) = (1000; 6000) and their initial sur-
vival probability (p1; p2) = (0:9; 0:2). The social project has the same
cost c = 500 for each agent. It increases their probability of survival to
(p1 + "1; p2 + "2) = (1; 0:25). Expected utility is simply survival probability
times wealth, i.e. Ui = pi £ wi: Thus, it is easy to show that the agents’
WTP zi are respectively z1 = ¡400 and z2 = 700.1 Since z1 + z2 = 300 > 0,
the WTP criterion leads to adopt the project. However, the project is wel-
fare reducing, since ¢(U1 + U2) = 1875 ¡ 2100 < 0, and thus should not be
adopted.
This example illustrates the fact that aggregating the WTP across agents
does not re‡ect their social valuation of the project. This is because agent 2
is not only richer, but he has also a higher probability of dying than agent 1.
Hence, relatively to agent 1, he is willing to spend a larger amount of money
to increase his chances of surviving. This heterogeneity across agents distorts
the social criterion in favor of the acceptance of the project. It is a source
of ine¢ciency since, once accepted, the project will be …nanced equally by
individuals 1 and 2.2
In this paper, we …rst explore with the help of a simple model the direc-
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tion in which the WTP approach distorts social valuation. The answer to
this question critically depends on the type of heterogeneity in the popula-
tion. We consider three types of heterogeneity: on wealth, baseline risk and,
risk reduction. Then, based on an existing Contingent Valuation analysis,
we investigate how much these di¤erent sources of heterogeneity a¤ect the
accuracy of the WTP approach as a measure of social welfare.
1 A Simple Model
We consider a simple model that allows us to think about the relation between
the social valuation of changes in mortality risks, and heterogeneity within
the population.
There are n agents in the economy. Agent i = 1; ::; n has a wealth wi
and a survival probability pi. His expected utility is piu(wi) + (1¡ pi)v(wi),
where u(:) and v(:) represent respectively the utility function of wealth con-
ditional on being alive and dead, with u > v. All agents have thus the same
(state-dependent) utility function, an assumption that permits interpersonal
comparisons of utility levels. We also assume that the utility functions are
increasing, twice di¤erentiable and concave, and that the marginal utility of
money is larger when the individual is alive, i.e. u0 > v0 ¸ 0.3 A project
entails a change "i in the mortality risk for individual i from pi to pi + "i.
The per capita cost of the project is c.
The social criterion may be described as follows. The project should be
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adopted in the economy if and only if
¢U =
nX
i=1
[(pi + "i)u(wi ¡ c) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)v(wi ¡ c) ¡ piu(wi) ¡ (1 ¡ pi)v(wi)] > 0:
(1)
We assume that the change of risk is relatively small, and that the cost of
the project c is negligible compared to the agents’ wealth. Using a …rst-order
Taylor development around wi, we get that (1) is almost equivalent to
¢U '
nX
i=1
[(pi + "i)(u(wi) ¡ cu0(wi)) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)(v(wi) ¡ cv0(wi)) (2)
¡piu(wi) ¡ (1 ¡ pi)v(wi)]
=
nX
i=1
["i(u(wi) ¡ v(wi)) ¡ c((pi + "i)u0(wi) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)v0(wi))]:
The social criterion for acceptance ¢U > 0 is thus equivalent to
B =
P
i "i(u(wi) ¡ v(wi))P
i(pi + "i)u0(wi) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)v0(wi) > c: (3)
In other words, the per capita bene…t should exceed the per capita cost of
the project.
Let us now turn to the WTP approach. Individual i’s net WTP zi is
de…ned by4
piu(wi) + (1 ¡ pi) v(wi) = (pi + "i)u(wi ¡ c¡ zi)
+(1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)v(wi ¡ c¡ zi) (4)
' (pi + "i)[u(wi) ¡ (c+ zi)u0(wi)]
+(1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)[v(wi) ¡ (c + zi)v0(wi)];
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so that we obtain
zi ' "i(u(wi) ¡ v(wi))(pi + "i)u0(wi) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)v0(wi) ¡ c: (5)
In accordance with intuition, the net WTP zi increases with a positive change
in the survival probability "i, decreases with the per capita cost of the project
c, increases with the baseline risk 1¡ pi and, given our assumption on u and
v, it also increases with wealth wi and with the curvature of u.5 Also, note
that zi is positive if and only if the project improves individual i’s welfare.
Hence, in principle, zi is an appropriate indicator of the impact of the project
on individual i’s welfare.6
The WTP criterion reduces to verify whether the net WTP is positive,
or equivalently that the average WTP is larger than the per capita cost:
Z =
1
n
nX
i=1
"i(u(wi) ¡ v(wi))
(pi + "i)u0(wi) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)v0(wi) > c: (6)
Note that (6) is not in general equivalent to the socially e¢cient criterion
(3). This is the case though when pi, "i and wi are independent of i; that
is when agents are homogeneous. Less restrictively, this is the case when
(pi + "i)u0(wi) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)v0(wi) is the same for any individual i; that
is, the WTP is an e¢cient criterion for the very special case in which the
marginal utility of money is the same across individuals.
More generally, it is immediate that the WTP criterion will overestimate
the value of the social project if and only if
1
n
nX
i=1
"i(u(wi) ¡ v(wi))
(pi + "i)u0(wi) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)v0(wi) ¡
P
i "i(u(wi) ¡ v(wi))P
i(pi + "i)u0(wi) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ "i)v0(wi)
= Z ¡B ¸ 0: (7)
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Take for instance the parameters given in the introductory example (for
which the …rst-order approximation is exact since utility is linear). Using
(7), we get that the WTP overestimates the bene…ts of the project by more
than a factor 2. Moreover, if the survival probability of agent 2 is lowered
to p2 = 0:01 instead of 0:2, then the overestimation factor becomes 6.75.
However, consider the initial example but switch now wealth endowments
between agent 1 and 2, (w1; w2) = (6000; 1000). Then, one can easily show
that the WTP criterion leads to underestimate the value of the project by a
factor of 1.3. The question is thus: under which conditions does the WTP
criterion lead to systematically overestimate or underestimate the value of
the project?
Before answering this question, let us state a Lemma that will prove to
be useful.
Lemma 1: Take a positive increasing (decreasing) function g : R ! R.
Condition
1
n
nX
i=1
f(xi)
g(xi)
¡
1
n
P
i f(xi)
1
n
P
i g(xi)
¸ 0;
holds if and only if f=g is decreasing (increasing).
The proof is straightforward from applying the Covariance rule.
Let us now examine the separate e¤ect of the three di¤erent sources of
heterogeneity. First, consider that there is only heterogeneity on survival
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probability pi. Then inequality (7) reduces to
1
n
nX
i=1
1
(pi + ")u0(w) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ ")v0(w) ¡
1
1
n
P
i(pi + ")u0(w) + (1 ¡ pi ¡ ")v0(w)
¸ 0;
which always holds under Jensen’s inequality.
Consider now heterogeneity on wealth wi alone. Then inequality (7)
reduces to the condition
1
n
nX
i=1
u(wi) ¡ v(wi)
(p+ ")u0(wi) + (1 ¡ p¡ ")v0(wi) ¡
P
i(u(wi) ¡ v(wi))P
i(p+ ")u0(wi) + (1 ¡ p¡ ")v0(wi) ¸ 0;
for any n and any (p; ") belonging to [0; 1]2. Applying Lemma 1 with g(x) =
(p+ ")u0(x) + (1¡ p¡ ")v0(x) and f(x) = u(x)¡ v(x) gives the result since,
under our assumptions on u and v, the function g is decreasing in x and
function f=g is increasing in x.
Consider …nally that the source of heterogeneity is on the change in mor-
tality risk "i. Then the left-hand side of (7) is
1
n
nX
i=1
"i
(p+ "i)u0(w) + (1 ¡ p¡ "i)v0(w) ¡
P
i "iP
i(p+ "i)u0(w) + (1 ¡ p¡ "i)v0(w) ;
for any n and p 2 [0; 1]. Applying Lemma 1 with g(x) = (p+ x)u0(w) + (1¡
p ¡ x)v0(w) and f(x) = x yields that the sign of the previous expression is
negative, since g and f=g are both increasing in x. Hence, this leads to the
following proposition.
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Proposition 1 Assume that the project induces a “small” change in mor-
tality risk, that its cost is uniformly distributed across the population and that
agents are (state-dependent) utility maximizers, then:
² i) If there is heterogeneity across the population either on the survival
probability pi or on wealth wi; then the WTP criterion leads to overes-
timate the social value of the project of mortality risk reduction.
² ii) If there is heterogeneity on the change of the mortality risk "i, then
the WTP criterion leads to underestimate the social value of the project
of mortality risk reduction.
To understand i), consider a symmetric situation in which two identical
individuals face the same survival probability p. In this homogenous society,
the aggregate WTP for a risk reduction program is equal to the social value
of the project. It is easy to verify that the social value of the project remains
unchanged if the agents now face di¤erent survival probabilities of the form
p1 = p ¡ ± and p2 = p + ±.7 Note, however, that the WTP zi in equation
(5) is convex in pi. Therefore, the aggregate WTP is now larger than in the
symmetric situation. In other words, the WTP criterion overestimates the
social value of a project because individuals’ WTP increase non-linearly with
a change in initial risk-exposure. This non-linearity is related to the “dead
anyway” e¤ect (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1996), namely that an individual with
a fatal disease may want to spend his entire wealth for a small chance of
cure. The e¤ect of wealth heterogeneity may be understood intuitively by
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considering the extreme case in which the distribution of wealth is assumed to
be unbounded. In this situation, it is always possible to …nd a small number
of rich individuals willing to pay for the entire risk reduction project. In other
words, there is no way to guarantee in this context that the WTP criterion
will reject any socially ine¢cient project.
An intuition for e¤ect ii) may be presented as follows. Suppose two
identical individuals are willing to pay $1,000 for a reduction by 1 in 1,000
of the risk of dying. Again, since there is no heterogeneity, aggregate WTP
coincides with social bene…t. The project has thus a $2,000 social value.
Now, suppose that instead of applying the project once to both individuals,
the risk reduction project is applied twice to a single individual, so that it
reduces his mortality risk by a 2 in 1,000. It is easy to see that this project
has the same social value in both cases. However, once this individual has
paid the 1,000$ for the …rst unit of risk reduction, he will be poorer and
less-exposed to risk. From (5), the WTP decreases when wealth or baseline
risk decreases. Hence, these two e¤ects make him less willing to pay another
$1,000 for the second unit of risk reduction. As a result, aggregate WTP
will be less than $2,000. Heterogeneity in the levels of risk reduction (0 in
1,000 for one individual and 2 in 1,000 for the other individual) thus leads
to underestimate the social value of the project compared to the case of
homogeneity (1 in 1,000 for both individuals).
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2 Simulations with a Contingent Valuation
Analysis
The e¤ects presented in Proposition 1 have been theoretical and qualitative.
In the present section, we investigate from a numerical perspective the e¤ects
of heterogeneity on wealth, baseline risk and risk reduction. We thus provide
some orders of magnitude for the estimation error for the social value of a
risk reduction project due to the use of the WTP approach.
We calibrate our simulations on a Contingent Valuation analysis of mor-
tality risk reduction conducted by Krupnick et al., (2002) on residents from
the province of Ontario, in which the authors paid a particular attention
to elicit actual WTP for risk reduction. Two groups of 630 and 300 respon-
dents were asked their WTP to reduce by respectively 5 and 1 in 10,000 their
baseline mortality risk.
Using the data provided in that study, we …rst calibrate a representative
agent in the economy. We consider an agent with an average revenue of
C$60,000 (standard deviation of C$35,000) and an annual average baseline
risk of 123/10,000 (standard deviation 123/10,000). We approximate the
mean wealth for the representative respondent by the annual revenues cumu-
lated over his lifetime. The average respondent in Krupnick et al. (2002)’s
study being 54 years old, we consider an additional 25 years lifetime with a
5% annual discount factor. Given these …gures, the average wealth is eval-
uated at C$906,078 (standard deviation of C$528,548). We adopt a square
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root utility function for u and, to simplify, we consider that the utility v
conditional on death is 0.
Krupnick et al., (2002) estimate that the average WTP for a 5/10,000 (re-
spectively 1/10,000) risk reduction is C$601 (respectively C$368), while our
calibrated model predicts a somewhat di¤erent WTP of C$916 (respectively
C$183). Note, however, that the WTP in Krupnick et al. are highly non
linear in risk reduction (i.e., agents are willing to contribute only 1.5 times
more for a risk reduction …ve times larger). In contrast, our model is based
on the expected utility framework, and therefore, the predicted WTP must
be proportional to the risk reduction. Under these circumstances, our model
cannot be expected to replicate precisely the non-linearities usually found in
Contingent Valuation studies (Corso et al., 2001).8 Nevertheless, our cali-
brated predictions may be considered as a good approximation, within the
expected utility framework, of the WTP found by Krupnick et al. (2002).
Moreover, this calibration exercise shows that the approximation “in the
small” is very good. Indeed, when we calculate the WTP separately from
equation (4), and from its …rst-order approximation in equation (5), we …nd
a mere C$0.232 or 2:5 10¡2% (respectively C$0.01 or 5:5 10¡3%) di¤erence
for a 5/10,000 (respectively 1/10,000) risk reduction.9
To quantify the e¤ect of heterogeneity, we generated a sample of size 106
to precisely estimate the means Z and B in this population. Wealths wi , and
baseline risks 1 ¡ pi were randomly and independently simulated from Log-
normal distributions.10 In order to get results comparable to Krupnick et al.
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(2002)’s, we used the previously mentioned means and standard deviations
to generate wi and pi.
Given these underlying distributions, our main simulation result is that
the mean WTP
¡
Z
¢
is C$917, while the per capita social bene…t
¡
B
¢
is
only C$792. Hence, using data collected by Krupnick et al. (2002), our
simulations suggest a 15.8% overestimation of the social bene…ts due to the
WTP approach.11 The WTP approach would also provide an overestimated
value of a statistical life equals to C$917/0.0005=C$1.834 million, while the
unbiased value of a statistical life is $C1.584 million. In other words, if the
per capita cost of the project lays between C$792 and C$917, the WTP
criteria would lead to implement a socially ine¢cient project.
It is interesting to examine to which source of heterogeneity this overes-
timation should be mainly attributed. Graphs 1 and 2 represent the mean
WTP and per capita social bene…t when there is only heterogeneity on base-
line risk or on wealth (the other variables are …xed to their mean values).
The heterogeneity across individuals is captured by the standard deviation
of the distribution from which the simulated data are drawn. These graphs
clearly indicate that heterogeneity on wealth is by itself responsible for most
of the di¤erence between mean WTP and per capita social bene…t. For the
standard deviations found in Krupnick et al., (2002), the estimation error is
about C$125 when there is wealth heterogeneity alone and a mere C$1 when
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there is baseline risk heterogeneity alone.
Insert Graphs 1, 2 and 3 about here
For the sake of completeness, we also analyzed the impact of heterogeneity
on risk reduction. The simulated values "i are generated from a Beta distri-
bution with a mean of 5/10,000 and varying standard deviations. Graph 3
indicates that the e¤ect of heterogeneity on risk reduction is rather limited.
Additional simulations with larger mean risk reduction do not signi…cantly
a¤ect the results. For instance, the distortion is in the vicinity of 1% (roughly
C$9), for a 5/1,000 mean risk reduction and 5/1,000 standard deviation.12
Finally, we examined the e¤ect of correlating wealth with individual’s
risk-exposure. Graph 4 (respectively 5) displays mean WTP and per capita
social bene…t as a function of the coe¢cient of correlation between wealth and
survival probability (respectively risk reduction).13 In the absence of informa-
tion on actual correlation coe¢cients, we were only interested in qualitative
e¤ects.
First, observe on both graphs that mean WTP is larger than per capita
social bene…t. This makes sense since heterogeneity on wealth dominates
other sources of heterogeneity, and leads the mean WTP to overestimate per
capita social bene…t.
Graph 4 shows that the extent of the overestimation decreases with the
coe¢cient of correlation between survival probability and wealth. Indeed,
when the coe¢cient of correlation is negative, rich people face relatively
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more baseline risk than poor people. Consequently, rich people’s WTP is
very large compared to poor people (dead-anyway e¤ect). Since using the
WTP criterion, i.e. voting by dollars, overweighs rich people’s welfare, a neg-
ative correlation leads to an important overestimation of the project. This
overestimation will be consequently reduced when the coe¢cient of correla-
tion becomes positive.
Insert Graphs 4 and 5 about here
Finally, Graph 5 displays an opposite e¤ect. Indeed, a positive corre-
lation between wealth and risk reduction implies that the project will be
relatively more bene…cial to rich people. As a result, rich people’s WTP, and
consequently mean WTP will rise with the correlation coe¢cient. The WTP
approach, therefore, enhances the overestimation of the project when wealth
and risk reduction are positively correlated.
3 Aggregate WTP and Cost-Bene…t Analysis
We have established that maximizing the aggregate WTP in the presence
of heterogeneity does not yield the same solution as maximizing the sum
of expected utilities. This section brie‡y relates our results to the relevant
literature on this topic.
Arnold Harberger (1971) presented the aggregate WTP approach as one
of his three postulates for applied welfare economics: “[C]osts and bene…ts
accruing to each member of the relevant group (e.g. a nation) should nor-
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mally be added without regard to the individual(s) to whom they accrue”
(Harberger, p.785).
The main basis for this postulate is the Kaldor-Hicks compensation prin-
ciple. This principle states that any project should be adopted if the gainers
can potentially compensate the losers. The key word here is “potentially”,
meaning that the compensation needs not to be actually paid. This prin-
ciple thus provides a strong theoretical basis for the use of the Contingent
Valuation method.
The fundamental public economics argument underlying the compensa-
tion principle relies on the possibility for the government to implement per-
fect individualized lump-sum transfers. In that case, the government would
choose the transfers so as to equalize the marginal value of money across
the population. Aggregate WTP then indeed becomes a correct measure of
social welfare. However, governments do not have the information, nor the
power to implement optimal lump-sum transfers.14 This raises the question:
What is the value of a risk-reducing public project under imperfect taxation
policies?
Common wisdom suggests that the value of any project should be reduced
under imperfect taxation. Indeed, the distortion cost from levying the taxes
to …nance the project should in principle be added to the costs generated
by the project. Atkinson and Stern’s (1974) analysis is actually consistent
with this intuition. They show that public good provision is in general lower
in the distortionary taxation optimum than in the lump-sum optimum (see
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Ballard and Fullerton (1992) or Myles (1995) for a survey discussions).
It is important to say that our approach is quite di¤erent from the one
usually adopted in public economics. Our objective was not to compare a
second-best optimum to a …rst-best optimum. The objective was to evaluate
whether a public project …nanced by distortionary taxation, but evaluated
by the aggregate WTP method (as if we were at the …rst-best optimum), will
be overestimated or underestimated.
The paper has shown that, in the context of a mortality risks reduction
project, there will be in general an overestimation of the project. Assuming
that there is no correlation between the three sources of heterogeneity, this
overestimation was found to be around 15%. This is a quite modest di¤er-
ence compared to the various other sources of misestimation (see for instance
Diamond and Hausman, 1994). Furthermore, remember that the main di¤er-
ence is due to wealth heterogeneity across the population, and that we have
considered a uniform taxation scheme (as in Wilson, 1991; see also Brekke,
1997). Hence, the use of this extreme form of taxation presumably provides
an upper bound for the misestimation, as, e.g., non-linear income taxation
would clearly perform better. This observation arguably supports the idea
that the unweighted aggregate WTP is a reasonable indicator in the speci…c
Contingent Valuation analysis that we have considered.
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4 Conclusion
It has been known for a long time that the WTP criterion is not a reliable
measure of social welfare. An extra-dollar has not the same value for every-
body, and simply aggregating the WTP over the population is theoretically
‡awed. In practice, in the context of a mortality risk reduction project, and
thus in many environmental valuation studies, this problem has not been
seriously addressed.
This paper is an attempt to investigate this long-standing issue. We have
considered a simple (state-dependent) expected utility model and we have
assumed that all individuals face the same costs for the social project and,
also, that the resulting mortality risk change is “small”. Under these assump-
tions, we have shown theoretically that heterogeneity on wealth or survival
probability (respectively, risk reduction) leads to overestimate (respectively,
underestimate) the social value of a public risk reduction project. Based on
a recent Contingent Valuation analysis, we have found this overestimation
to be in the vicinity of 15%. Compared to other potential sources of in-
accuracy of the Contingent Valuation method, this source of misestimation
seems rather small. However, correlations among the di¤erent forms of het-
erogeneity (e.g., if the program reduces rich people’s mortality risks) might
signi…cantly enhance the misestimation bias, a problem that we could not
examined due to our sample limitations.
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Notes
1The general formulae will be given in (4).
2Obviously, if it was possible to …nance the project by making the two individuals
contribute their actual WTP, e¢ciency would be retrieved. Yet, governments do not have,
in general, the power to implement optimal (and costless) taxes. This issue is related to
the optimal taxation literature, and it will be brie‡y discussed in Section 3.
3Viscusi and Evans (1990) provide some empirical support to this assumption.
4Again, we assume that c + zi is negligible compared to the agents’ wealth.
5The comparative statics of survival probability, baseline risk or wealth on the WTP
is well-known (see, e.g., Jones-Lee, 1976, Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1996). The comparative
statics of the curvature of u is examined in Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2003) and Foncel
and Treich (2003).
6We say “in principle” since in practice nothing guarantees that people reveal their
actual WTP.
7This relies, of course, on the linearity of the social welfare function in the probabilities.
For a related discussion, see Ulph (1982).
8To better match the WTP observed in Contingent Valuation analyses, one would need
to adopt a non-expected utility approach. Although this approach clearly deserves more
attention in the future, we did not adopt it here as our theoretical results in section 2 are
based on the expected utility framework.
9Moreover, for a larger risk-reduction, such as 100 in a 10,000 change in risk, the
…rst-order approximation would still be quite good: we …nd C$18,163.3 compared to
C$18,072.3.
10Since baseline risk is a probability, its corresponding Lognormal distribution has been
truncated at 1.
11Simulations have been conducted for three other utility functions u(x) = x0:25; u(x) =
x0:75 and u(x) = log(x), for Normal distributions truncated at 0, and with utility functions
v conditional on death equal to ku(x) with k 2 [0; 0:5]. The orders of magnitude are
comparable.
12Also, we made use of our numerical simulations to explore the e¤ect of heterogeneity
on risk aversion. We considered a power utility function ui(w) = w1¡°i with heterogenous
relative risk aversion parameters °i. These parameters were drawn from a Beta distribution
with mean 0.5 (which corresponds to a square root utility function) and standard devia-
tions up to 0.25. Our simulations indicate that heterogeneity on risk aversion may have a
dramatic impact on the overestimation of social bene…ts, even larger than heterogeneity
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on wealth. In particular, the WTP overestimates the per capita social bene…t by about
40% for a 0.15 standard deviation. However, such results are of little theoretical relevance
since heterogeneity on preferences reintroduces the problem of interpersonal comparisons
of utility levels.
13To create some correlation between the variables we consider a joint distribution be-
longing to the Morgenstern class of multivariate distributions with cumulative distribution
function (CDF) G(c1; c2) = F1(c1)F2(c2)[1+®(1¡F1(c1))(1¡F2(c2))], where F1(:) is the
marginal CDF of wealth and F2(:) is the CDF of the baseline risk or risk reduction. The
parameter ® ² ]-1,+1[ determines the correlation between the two random variables. In
particular, the variables are independent when ® = 0.
14If the government would have perfect information, there would be actually no need
for a Contingent Valuation analysis.
19
References
Atkinson, Anthony B. and Nicholas H. Stern, 1974, “Pigou, taxation and
public goods”, Review of Economic Studies, 41, 119-28.
Ballard, Charles L. and Don Fullerton, 1992, “Distortionary taxes and
the provision of public goods”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6, 117-31.
Blackorby, Charles and David Donaldson, 1990, “A review article: The
case against the use of the sum of compensating variations in cost-bene…t
analysis”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 23, 471-94.
Boadway, Robin, 1982, “The welfare foundations of cost bene…t analysis”,
Economic Journal, 84, 926-39.
Brekke, Kjell A., 1997, “The numéraire matters in cost-bene…t analysis”,
Journal of Public Economics, 64, 117-23.
Corso, Phaedra S., Hammitt, James K. and John D. Graham, 2001,
“Valuing mortality-risk reduction: Using visual aids to improve the valid-
ity of Contingent Valuation”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 23, 165-84.
Diamond, Peter A. and Jerry A. Hausman, 1994, “Contingent Valuation:
Is some number better than no number?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives,
8, 45-64.
Drèze, Jacques H., 1962, “L’utilité sociale d’une vie humaine”, Revue
Française de Recherche Opérationnelle, 22, 139-155.
Drèze, Jean, 1998, “Distribution matters in cost-bene…t analysis: Com-
ment on K.A. Brekke”, Journal of Public Economics, 70, 485-88.
20
Drèze, Jean and Nicholas H. Stern, 1987, “The theory of cost-bene…t
analysis”, in Auerbach, A.J. and M. Feldstein (Eds), Handbook of Public
Economics, Elsevier, North-Holland.
Eeckhoudt, Louis and James Hammitt, 2003, “Risk aversion and mortal-
ity risks”, Journal of Environmental and Economics Management, forthcom-
ing.
Foncel, Jérôme and Nicolas Treich, 2003, “Fear of ruin”, mimeo, Leerna,
University of Toulouse.
Harberger, Arnold C., 1971, “Three basic postulates for applied welfare
economics: An interpretative essay”, Journal of Economic Literature, 9, 785-
97.
Jones-Lee, Michael W., 1976, The Value of Life: An Economic Analysis,
University of Chicago.
Krupnick, Alan, Alberini, Anna, Cropper, Maureen, Simon, Nathalie,
O’Brien, Bernie, Goeree, Ronald, and Martin Heintzelman, 2002, “Age,
wealth and the willingness to pay for mortality risk reductions: A Contingent
Valuation survey of Ontario residents”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 24,
161-86.
Myles, Gareth, 1995, Public Economics, Chapter 9: Public Goods, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press.
Pratt, John W. and Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1996, “Willingness to pay
and the distribution of risk and wealth”, Journal of Political Economy, 104,
747-63.
21
Schelling, Thomas C., 1968, “The life you save may be your own”, in
S.B. Chase, Jr., in Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis, The Brookings
Institutions.
Ulph, Alistair, 1982, “The role of ex ante and ex post decisions in the
valuation of life”, Journal of Public Economics, 18, 266-76.
Viscusi, W. Kip and W. Evans, 1990, “Utility functions that depend on
health status: Estimates and economic implications”, American Economic
Review, 80, 353-74.
Viscusi, W. Kip, 1993, “The value of risks to life and health”, Journal of
Economic Literature, 31, 1912-46.
Wilson, John D., 1991, “Optimal public good provision with limited
lump-sum taxation”, American Economic Review, 81, 153-66.
22
GRAPH 1
Willingness To Pay and Social Benefit
with Heterogeneity on Wealth
700
750
800
850
900
950
0 200 000 400 000 600 000 800 000
Standard Deviation of the Wealth (Mean=905,648) 
A
m
o
u
n
t 
in
 C
$
Average Willingness To Pay Per Capita Social Benef it
23
GRAPH 2
Willingness To Pay and Social Benefit with
Heterogeneity on Annual Survival Probability
916,40
916,50
916,60
916,70
916,80
0,000 0,005 0,010 0,015
Standard Deviation of the Annual Survival 
Probability (Mean=0.9877) 
A
m
o
u
n
t 
in
 C
$
Average Willingness To Pay Per Capita Social Benefit
24
GRAPH 3
Willingness To Pay and Social Benefit
with Heterogeneity on Risk Reduction
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GRAPH 4
Willingness To Pay and Social Benefit
with Heterogeneity and Correlation between 
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GRAPH 5
Willingness To Pay and Social Benefit
with Heterogeneity and Correlation between 
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